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Abstract
Context: International scholarship and policy tend to depict national structures governing 
Vocational Education and Training (VET) as uniform and devoid of internal differences. 
This macro perspective neglects the numerous processes at the meso and micro level that 
shape the structure and content of VET. This article focusses on professional associations 
(meso level) in Switzerland to examine the heterogeneity of governance of individual VET 
programmes that can exist within one country or one collective skill formation system.
Approach: Drawing on insights from historical institutionalism and research on corpora-
tism, we argue that these differences are the product of the characteristics, traditional practi-
ces and styles of reasoning of the various associations involved in VET governance. Our 
analysis is based on expert interviews and governance documents in two vocational areas: 
Electrotechnology and food services.
Findings: We identify and decode an array of cooperative practices and show that collective 
skill formation has a different meaning for different associations and, correspondingly, dif-
ferent occupations. Collaboration with state actors, unions, VET schools and single firms, 
as well as voting procedures, differ considerably between associations. Furthermore, we find 
that these different modes of governance are determined by associational characteristics 
such as size, level of professionalization, location and established cooperative practices, as 
well as traditional styles of reasonings. 
*Corresponding author: regula.buergi@uzh.ch
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Conclusion: The findings indicate that the decisions taken are not always the product of 
current day training requirements but of historically grown associational characteristics. 
Thus, path dependencies are to be considered not only at a macro level but also at the meso 
level. There is a multifaceted variety of governance approaches beneath the classification 
"collective skill formation system". Associations are key in defining VET content, working 
life structures and collectivity.
Keywords: VET, Vocational Education and Training, Governance, Collective Skill Formati-
on, Historical Institutionalism, Corporatism, Styles of Reasoning in VET
1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, Vocational Education and Training (VET) has been assigned a 
key role in coping with the challenges of globalization, digitalization and other sweeping 
transformations of the 21st century. A recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) review of different VET systems found that "after a period of relative 
neglect in many countries, apprenticeship and other forms of work-based learning are expe-
riencing a revival" (OECD, 2018, p. 11). In this context, Switzerland has increasingly become 
a role model, because it has a longstanding tradition of classroom instruction and on-the-job 
training (the "dual system") that relies on a specific form of governance, labelled collective 
skill formation (Busemeyer & Trampusch, 2012; Krummenacher, 2018).
Approaches that seek to transfer the Swiss model to other countries tend to neglect or un-
derestimate the heterogenous character of "duality", particularly the plurality of coordinating 
actors and multifaceted forms of cooperation and governance. Whereas differences regar-
ding dual organizations are well-known and researched (Wettstein & Gonon, 2009), there is 
a dearth of knowledge about different modes of governance. Scholars have advocated further 
study of decentralized cooperation in vocational education, proposing that "…since actual 
cooperation can rarely be imposed by law but happens on the ground, it is likely to vary along 
regional, sectoral and occupational lines…" (Emmenegger et al., 2018, p. 5).
The particular characteristics of Swiss VET governance have been studied extensively and 
compared to other countries (Rauner & Wittig, 2009). For instance, political scientists have 
categorized Switzerland’s VET as a prime example of collective skill formation (Busemeyer 
& Trampusch, 2012; Gonon & Maurer, 2012), decentralized cooperation (Emmenegger et 
al., 2018), plural governance (Rauner & Wittig, 2009, p. 45) and public-private partnership. 
While this focus on the national (macro) level dominates research, intermediary associations 
(meso level) and single firms (micro level) have rarely been addressed, even though they are 
crucial parts of collective governance.
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This article sheds light on the different practices behind those classifications at the macro 
level by focussing on the meso level of governance, namely the professional associations. The 
following questions guide the analysis: What are the associational characteristics of coope-
ration practices? What are the reasons for the various approaches? The article thus explores 
not only the how of governance, but also the why; a crucial question that is neglected in many 
studies (Benz et al., 2007, pp. 19–20; Rosenmund, 2019). Drawing on insights from historical 
institutionalism and literature on corporatism, we will argue that the variety of governance 
approaches is not only shaped by "rational" deliberations and requirements endorsed by each 
occupation’s respective industry, but also by the path dependent characteristics, modes of 
cooperation and styles of reasoning of each occupation’s responsible professional association.
To identify the different cooperative practices and decipher the driving logic, this study 
focusses on the Swiss Commissions for Professional Development and Quality (Schweize-
rische Kommissionen für Berufsentwicklung und Qualität—hereafter referred to as "Com-
missions" or "Commissions B&Q"). These Commissions were created for every occupational 
field following the VET Act of 2002, to oversee the content and quality of vocational training. 
They generally consist of stakeholders from the state (cantonal and federal government au-
thorities) and professional associations, but as the legislation does not stipulate clear criteria 
for membership, professional associations from each occupation fill the Commissions and 
determine their tasks. The Commissions—described as the "heart of collective governance 
[Verbundpartnerschaft]" (Fleischmann, 2012)—are the optimal object of investigation since 
they represent a neuralgic point for governance at the meso level that is directed by professi-
onal associations.
In this paper we provide insight into different modes of cooperation and the logic that 
shapes them. Our analysis focusses on two occupational fields: Food services and electro-
technology. We conducted eleven in-depth expert interviews with chairmen and chairwo-
men of every Commission B&Q in the two fields. We supplemented the interview data with 
information gathered from a variety of other sources, such as national and occupational re-
gulations, and annual reports from professional associations. By decoding and disentangling 
the cooperative processes, we contribute to a more nuanced picture of VET governance in 
Switzerland, and thus one case of collective skill formation in particular. 
In the first section, we provide an overview of the theories that inform our study and show 
how our work relates to previous studies. Second, we describe our case selection strategy 
and methodology. We then focus on empirical data by examining the variety of cooperative 
practices and disentangling the different underlying associational characteristics and styles 
of reasoning. We conclude by emphasizing that associations are key not only by defining VET 
content, but collectivity and working life structures.
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2 Governance Regimes in VET
This article draws upon insights from historical institutionalism, research on corporatism and 
associations in VET. Studies in historical institutionalism have shown that existing practices 
develop stable developmental trajectories along path dependencies, which guarantee a con-
tinuity of established structures and processes (Beyer, 2015; Mahoney, 2000). Once put into 
motion, developments gather strength, reinforce existing pathways, make breaks and radical 
transformation unlikely and encourage incremental change to meet new requirements or 
demands (Pierson, 2000). Thelen (2004) and Busemeyer and Trampusch (2012) applied the 
approach of historical institutionalism to vocational education. Thelen argued that industri-
alized states and their vocational education systems are not converging globally. She stressed 
that differences will remain because of "national production regimes" and observed that the 
answer to the question of "why institutions take the form they do" is historical not functional 
(Thelen, 2004, pp. 1, 26). Drawing on the work of Thelen, Busemeyer and Trampusch noted: 
The establishment of a collective institutional framework is not the result of a rationalistic 
process of deliberation among firms searching for the optimal skill formation strategy. 
Instead, training institutions have deep roots in the history of politics and society, which 
in the case of apprenticeships, often go back to the Middle Ages. (Busemeyer & Tram-
pusch, 2012, p. 7)
VET systems cannot be seen only as need-oriented variables of companies. Rather, they must 
ultimately be understood against the backdrop of a political culture that expresses itself in 
"routines of processing and solving society’s problems of organization" (Rosenmund, 2019), 
or in a "production or work order of a country" (Trampusch, 2014, p. 165).
It is exactly this aspect that is emphasized by the "varieties of capitalism" approach. "Many 
actors learn to follow a set of informal rules by virtue of experience with a familiar set of 
actors and the shared understandings that accumulate from this experience constitute so-
mething like a common culture" (Hall & Soskice, 2001, p. 13). In the Swiss case, this com-
mon culture corresponds to a "coordinated market economy" rather than a "liberal market 
economy" (Hall & Soskice, 2001, p. 13). The former is distinguished by the fact that it designs 
its qualification systems in a process of "collective skill formation" and thus expresses itself 
through high levels of regulation and involvement of private companies. These constellati-
ons tend to bring about dual VET models, as found in Switzerland, Germany, Austria and 
Denmark (Busemeyer & Trampusch, 2012). Comparative studies that rely on the "varieties of 
capitalism" approach explain national characteristics of VET governance systems by way of 
their respective political systems (Mayer & Solga, 2008; Bosch & Charest, 2008). These stu-
dies have been criticized for the fact that they tell us little about national particularities and 
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the internal national differences between countries with the same political system (Goergen 
et al., 2012; Gonon, 2016).
These national varieties would become visible by shedding light on decentralized VET 
cooperation. Current knowledge about cooperation processes "on the ground" is limited, 
even though it is a core element of collective skill formation systems (Emmenegger et al., 
2018). Research on corporatism can provide first indications of the idiosyncrasies of decen-
tral cooperation. A corporatist governance is distinguished by the cooperation of state and 
labour market stakeholders, represented in intermediary associations such as professional 
organizations, as is usual in systems of collective skill formation (Culpepper & Thelen, 2008). 
Studies on corporatism have shown that different work relationships and forms of social 
partnership can be traced back not only to the degree of inclusion of social partners and 
the degree of state control, but also to factors regarding companies, occupation and branch 
membership (Culpepper, 2003, 2007; Meyrat, 2000; Trampusch, 2014). Associations have to 
negotiate compromises between collective and company-specific interests (Behrens, 2017). 
Swiss associations responsible for VET tend to (up to 97%) represent the employer’s interest 
(Emmenegger et al., 2019) whereas unions—due to a path dependent development of Swiss 
VET—are hardly represented in VET governance compared to those in Germany. Further-
more, studies have shown that associations act in their own right (Strebel et al., 2019a; Seitzl 
& Emmenegger, 2019) and tend to unfold their own logic to maintain the status quo (Hotz-
Hart, 2008, p. 115). "The logics of occupations [and thus professional associations that are 
responsible for them] build on reproduction and further development of existing structures 
and programmes. Associations are thus less focussed on young people’s individual educa-
tional requirements and on research and innovation, but oriented towards a timely adapted 
reproduction of the occupational offspring" (Bauder, 2008, p. 42). 
This research on associations leads to two assumptions. First, we propose that the cha-
racteristics of associations influence their governance approaches in VET; second, drawing 
upon historical institutionalism, we argue that over time, they developed specific cooperati-
on practices and styles of reasoning that significantly shape their decisions. In other words, 
we expect to find path dependencies (as hinted by Bauder’s logic of reproduction) at the meso 
level of governance, much as at the macro level (as outlined by research based on historical 
institutionalism). It is assumed that associations are like nation states, bound to their institu-
tional legacy and, in a nutshell, not only functionally but historically informed.
3 Case Selection Strategy and Methodology
In order to explore the associational characteristics of cooperation and to shed light on the 
reasons or reasonings behind these various approaches, this study analyses Commissions 
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B&Q, their compositions and their ways of working. In the following, we contextualize these 
Commissions within Swiss VET governance and highlight their significance.
The collective governance of Swiss VET is generally based on three institutional princip-
les: Federalism, corporatism and consensus democracy. The last principle does not corres-
pond to any formal constitutional rules, but to a practice developed over time that primarily 
aims to involve a large number of individuals in consensus decision-making (Berner, 2013, 
pp. 40–42). The corporatist structure of Swiss vocational training is characterized by a decen-
tralized organization and cooperation of state and labour market actors (Oesch, 2011; Degen, 
2012). Thus, responsibilities are shared between associations and the state (cantons and fede-
ral government). It is notable that the involvement of the associations does not occur com-
pulsorily in chambers, as in Germany, but takes place voluntarily (Armingeon, 1997). The 
cooperation between the associations and the state, and between the associations themselves, 
is based on a legal framework that leaves a great degree of freedom and scope for negotiation. 
This can result in partial conflict prevention (Gonon & Zehnder, 2016, pp. 49–50) and makes 
cooperation dependent on a "shared logic of actions" (Emmenegger et al., 2018). 
Swiss VET is therefore operationalized at three levels: The federal VET office (responsible 
for general governance), the canton departments for economy and education (responsible for 
implementation) and the employees’ and employers’ (professional) associations (responsible 
for the content and specifics of occupational training). Presently, there are 146 associations 
responsible for the 230 occupations in Switzerland. Four different types can be distinguis-
hed: company, professional, employee associations and specialized educational organizations 
(Strebel et al., 2019b). Usually, one association is responsible for one occupation or occupati-
onal field. This means that they develop education plans and regulations for their respective 
occupations and submit these to the federal office for approval.
In the wake of the VET Act 2002 and encouraged by the federal authorities, the associa-
tions started to establish Commissions B&Q. At the formal level, there are no unambiguous 
overarching regulations for the Commissions, as they are not explicitly mentioned in the 
VET Act (BBG 2002, Art. 8; Berner, 2013; Meyer, 2007). Although the law places respon-
sibility for quality assurance with the providers of vocational training (and hence with the 
associations), it does not stipulate how they must fulfil this duty. The subordinate Vocational 
Training Directive (BBV 2003, Art. 12) is more specific, but it too affords the associations a 
great deal of freedom. It imposes no conditions on how the associations determine the tasks 
of the Commissions and only two conditions on how they determine Commission member-
ship: (i) In addition to representatives from the respective associations, the committee must 
contain at least one representative from the federal authority and (ii) must adequately repre-
sent Switzerland’s language regions.
The lack of concrete legal requirements led to the creation of an informal regulatory pro-
cess, which in turn gave rise to written guidelines for the Commissions. The guidelines, deve-
52 Varieties Within a Collective Skill Formation System
loped collaboratively by federal authorities, cantons and one of the umbrella associations, re-
commend that the Commissions periodically review VET curricula and quality, and update 
them to meet changing professional demands (SGV et al., 2014, p. 3). This duty positions the 
Commissions as very important actors in decentralized VET governance, especially with re-
gard to the respective occupation’s regulation and curricula. The guidelines also suggest that 
alongside the membership stipulated by the Vocational Training Directive, the Commissions 
also contain representatives from the cantons and teaching staff (vocational schools) (SGV 
et al., 2014, p. 6).
The professional associations are therefore largely free in determining the membership 
and tasks of the Commissions B&Q. The composition and tasks of the board are formally 
fixed in the Bildungsverordnungen (regulation for each occupation). The fact that all VET 
stakeholders come together in these Commissions, yet the respective associations are (al-
most) free to choose the representatives and define the tasks, makes the Commissions B&Q 
crystallization points of collective governance at the meso level. This means that they are 
optimal objects of study to explore how associations cooperate and why they act like they do.
Our analysis focusses on the Commissions B&Q of two occupational fields: Food services 
and electrotechnology.1 Research on corporatism has shown that branch membership can 
influence associations’ characteristics of cooperation. These two representative occupational 
fields have been chosen because they are different fields but have similarities with regard to 
composition. This approach allows us to identify and decipher typical patterns of cooperati-
on for the respective branches. Both fields cover a wide variety of companies, from the tech-
nologically advanced and internationally orientated to smaller, more traditional locally based 
firms (Roth, 2007; Keller & Kurzen, 2012). In addition, the occupations they represent are 
quite heterogeneous with regard to the required skills and the number of trainees2 (Stalder, 
2011) and both are facing challenges—albeit for different reasons—in recruiting adequate 
numbers of apprentices (cf. Berner, 2018; Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft, 2016, p. 41).
In the field of nutrition there are six associations and in the field of electrotechnology 
 there are five associations that are accountable for the respective occupations, compositions 
and tasks of the Commissions B&Q. They all belong to the category of professional associ-
ations, but differ with regard to size and professionalization: Some have up to 21 full time 
employees, while others are staffed on an entirely part time basis.3
1 See Schweizerisches Dienstleistungszentrum Berufsbildung/Berufs-, Studien und Laufbahnberatung [SDBB] (2018). Food 
services includes occupations in the fields of nutrition and food technology. Electrotechnology includes occupations from 
the fields of electrical installation and electronics.
2 In total there are six occupations in nutrition (n) and 10 in electrotechnology (e). In 2016, four (1n + 3e) had more than 600 
apprentices, seven (2n + 5e) had 100 to 600 and five had fewer than 100 (3n + 2e) (SBFI, 2020).
3 The field of nutrition consists of two big (Schweizerischer Bäcker-Confiseurmeister-Verband, OdA AgriAliForm), two me-
dium-sized (Schweizerischer Fleischfachverband; Milchwirtschaftlicher Verein) and two small associations (Schweizerischer 
Verein Arbeitswelt Müller/in; Arbeitsgemeinschaft Lebensmitteltechnologen/in). The field of electrotechnology consists of 
two big (Verband der Maschinen-Elektro- und Metallindustrie, EIT.swiss), two medium-sized (Verband Schweizerischer 
Elektrizitätsunternehmen; MultimediaTec Swiss) and one small association (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Lehrmeister von Phy-
siklaboranten).
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Data collection comprised 11 expert interviews conducted with the chairwomen (n = 1) and 
chairmen (n = 10) of the Commissions B&Q whose members are recruited by the responsible 
associations.4 Interview data were complemented with documents, such as the regulations 
of the different occupations (Bildungsverordnungen), where membership and tasks of the 
Commissions B&Q are formally described, as well as annual reports from the professional 
associations. The interviews were semi-structured, consisting of open questions (focussing 
on the characteristics of cooperative practices) and problem-oriented sequences (focussing 
on the underlying reasonings) (Kruse, 2015; Helfferich, 2011). The interviews were fully 
transcribed and coded. For the first research question, concerning the associational charac-
teristics of cooperation practices, the coding focussed on three key elements of cooperation: 
Membership (who, how many?), recruiting and voting procedures, and ways of working. 
These categories were derived from studies on corporatism, which have shown that these 
aspects influence cooperation practices significantly (Culpepper, 2003, 2007; Meyrat, 2000; 
Trampusch, 2014).
For the second question, concerning the reasons for the different practices, the catego-
ries were inductively generated by reconstructing the logic behind the association’s diverse 
actions (Meuser & Nagel, 2009, 2010; Bogner et al., 2014; Bogner & Menz, 2009). Thus, in 
contrast to the most popular approach of process tracing within historical institutionalism, 
we tried to identify and decipher path dependencies via the reasonings or elaborations on 
decisions put forward by the experts we interviewed. By doing so, we were able to extract 
the following intertwined factors that explain the diversity of the Commissions: Age, size, 
level of professionalization, location, financial strength, membership, established cooperative 
practices and styles of reasoning.
4 Varieties of Cooperative Practices
In the following, we briefly outline the formal and informal profiles and practices of the 
Commissions B&Q, i.e., how they govern. The characteristics or heterogeneity of associatio-
nal governance is demonstrated by showing differences regarding board members, recruiting 
and voting procedures, and ways of working. 
All Commissions B&Q adhere to formal and informal guidelines regarding tasks and 
membership, but this merely represents the lowest common denominator among the dif-
ferent associations. Differences are clearly evident between the different associations rather 
than different occupational fields, since no governance pattern is evident within one of the 
fields. For instance, some Commissions are allowed to operate detached from their professi-
onal associations. These Commissions may submit proposals for VET changes directly to the 
4  Interviews lasted 60-90 minutes. They took place between March and December 2018, on the premises of the associations or 
companies; one was conducted at the University of Zurich.
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national authorities, while the majority of Commissions must first submit their ideas to the 
associations. The membership of the Commissions can also vary greatly despite all having 
representatives from the federal authorities, cantons, professional associations and teaching 
staff. For example, the number of members ranges from seven to 19 people. This is not only 
due to the size of the professions but also to differences in recruiting practices between the 
associations. Some Commissions have representatives from multiple associations whose 
companies carry out VET; others have representatives from individual companies engaged 
in VET and from companies that do not perform VET. 
The number of school and canton representatives in the Commissions is similarly diverse. 
Some Commissions, especially for smaller professions, have representatives from all the vo-
cational schools. Many Commissions have two canton representatives (instead of the recom-
mended one), as this may allow them to cover different language regions. In order to better 
represent Switzerland’s two larger language regions (French and German), some associations 
base important functions (such as president and secretary) in different locations.
Another area of difference is trade union representation. While trade unions tend to play 
a marginal role in Swiss VET—particularly compared to Germany (Emmenegger et al., 2018, 
p. 18)—this varies among the Commissions we examined. For some professions, worker or 
union representatives take up to four spots on the Commissions; others lack a single emplo-
yee representative. 
Recruitment approaches are generally similar across all associations, as the general as-
semblies of the professional associations elect their representatives for the Commissions. In 
many cases, these elections confirm the nominated candidates. This is because the post of 
representative takes time and effort, and takes post-holders away from their day job. One 
interviewee said "the [election] is always close to 100 per cent. And if it is not 100 per cent, 
then this is because one person fell asleep (laughter) or person was too lazy to raise his hand. 
So, it’s more about...signing off [on the nominees]" (Interview C). 
However, there are major differences in voting rights. In some Commissions, all partici-
pants get one vote, but in others, the representatives of the federal authorities, cantons and 
associations each have one vote, which forces consensus. School representatives tend to be 
excluded from voting. In some cases, for specific topics such as funding, only industry repre-
sentatives are allowed to vote. 
Despite their differences in membership and forms of cooperation, the Commissions 
share the same culture of cooperation across interest groups. Interviewees reported that the 
Commissions rarely hold votes; though different interests exist, the members place much 
value on finding a consensus. Most interviewees connected this approach to the consensus 
democracy that defines Switzerland’s political culture. Metaphors such as "getting everyone 
on board" and "broad support" were common in the interviews. The Commissions wanted to 
avoid conflicts or the rejection of reforms because "we know each other in the branch, and 
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thus we have to rely on being able to talk to each other. Creating fronts is useless" (Inter-
view E). One interviewee referred to the people involved in the VET of one small profession 
as a family (Interview G).
Company and association representatives regard the growing body of federal regulations 
as inflexible, rigid and unreliable. Interviewees said the regulations allow little room for ne-
gotiation. In the past, the pressure mostly came internally, from companies. Now the pressure 
is more external, especially with regard to the time frame for revising VET, as the Com-
missions are required to review the VET of their respective profession every five years. The 
interviewees also criticized the recent requirement to base contents on competence models. 
These professionalization trends were felt to present challenges to smaller and part time as-
sociations. One interviewee pointedly complained: "So [they] motivate me to go up a moun-
tain, backpack full, heavy. And after I’ve barely arrived at the top, [they say], well done...but 
look now, over there [is] the next mountain" (Interview G). These changes were felt to be less 
controversial among associations whose companies possess professional training structures, 
i.e., full time VET employees with dedicated time and expertise, because these companies 
can shoulder the work for the associations and thus have more influence and room to ma-
noeuvre.
5 Reasons for Different Governance Approaches
Since there are no patterns of governance discernible within one of the occupational fields, 
the cooperation practices of the Commissions B&Q are not determined by the occupational 
field. The various modes of governance arise from the different characteristics of the res-
ponsible associations (age, size, professionalization, location, financial strength and mem-
bership) and the cooperation practices and specific styles of reasoning developed over time. 
Decisions are therefore not only made on a functional basis, but are historically informed to 
a considerable degree. In the following, we shed light on these determining characteristics, 
practices of cooperation and styles of reasoning.
Age, Size and Level of Professionalization 
The Commissions B&Q tend to have more flexibility in governance if the association that 
is responsible for an occupation was newly founded. This is because there are no historical 
paths to determine a Commission’s tasks and practices.
Larger associations tend to see more politicized Commission elections. While smaller 
associations complain that they have to "knock on doors" (Interview H) to recruit members 
so that elections are usually decided unanimously, an interviewee from a major association 
referred to his election as president of the Commission as a "fight" that ultimately turned 
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on a dispute between the cantons rather than on the actual qualifications of the candidates 
(Interview D). 
Other associations explicitly choose to remain small to avoid politicized elections, alt-
hough they could easily join larger associations. One interviewee reflected on the nature of 
being a small association: 
The advantage of being small is of course, I mean...as I said, I can pick up the phone and 
maybe call...let's say 10 people. And then we can decide whether to do something what we 
do...of course, being so flexible is an advantage. The downside is...this office does a lot...
let's say 80% (laughter) probably comes out of this office. (Interview C)
This interviewee’s company possesses professionalized training structures for generating the-
se capacities, which is another example of how different the influence of single firms can be. 
Professionalization plays an important role; some associations have full time personnel, while 
others work with a small staff on a part time basis. Generally, the greater an association’s pro-
fessionalization, the more its agenda is predefined and the more it is developed by its office 
staff. Furthermore, associations with highly professional structures are increasingly involved 
in drafting and developing national models and strategies, giving them greater influence at 
the national level.
Location, Financial Strength and Membership
Both the increasing professional requirements and the geographical location of associations 
and companies can encourage an accumulation of roles or positions within committees. 
Companies located in central Switzerland or near associations are more likely to participate. 
One interviewee reflected: 
I find that [the participation of western Switzerland is] a bit difficult because...the sessions 
always take place in Zurich, because that just makes sense. Because most of them come 
from Zurich anyway. That means that they [the western Swiss] always have a long way to 
travel. And hence they do not come very often...I find this this very problematic. (Inter-
view C)
Likewise, an interviewee from another association in Bern emphasized that people would be 
more involved if they were "around an hour outside of Bern and not just from Upper Valais 
and from the Graubünden...But we try to do as good a job as we can" (Interview F).
The financial strength and infrastructural factors of the associations also play a central 
role in cooperative practices. For example, associations tend to cooperate with others if their 
professions are affiliated with the same vocational school, where they benefit from infrastruc-
tural "synergies" (Interview I) that are not exclusively professional. There are also associations 
that work with others to create new professions to achieve a critical mass for key financing 
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issues, especially high attendance in school classrooms. Infrastructural factors can also deter-
mine whether associations seek collaboration with others or seek to govern their profession 
independently. For example, an association whose profession experienced a substantial dec-
line in the number of trainees and which had not previously engaged in networking decided 
to work with other associations and create a new profession. Instead of settling for a smaller 
number of trainees, it is now looking to cooperate with other associations in order to main-
tain the size of its association and, in particular, to continue to fund its training centre.
The specific membership or characteristics of the companies represented by the associa-
tion influences recruitment and cooperation practices of the Commissions. For example, it 
is desirable for associations to create VET programmes that are as attractive as possible for 
companies; the goal is to maximize the number of companies able to train the profession 
with as much freedom as possible. One strategy is to formulate open VET regulations and 
curricula. One interviewee described his association as: 
More of an...association that brings together all those who cannot be trained in a large 
profession...those who do not fit in come to us. And then we try to make the best of it. 
Even if the situations can be very different. Even company size or products. [This is why] 
our VET regulations and curricula are very, how should I put it? Not vague...[so let’s say] 
non-specific. And afterwards, companies have to implement all this or translate it all for 
themselves. (Interview A)
Existing market hegemonies are also reflected in the Commissions B&Q. For example, do-
minant companies usually have the financial resources to participate in several committees, 
which affords them greater influence. As one interviewee told us:
So in this [association] of course, [name of firm] plays a big role because we have the ma-
jority. So…we have the largest...market share in Switzerland. This means that we have a 
lot to say in all the committees because we pay more at the association level. (Interview A)
Another interviewee told us "those who pay more should say more and those who pay less...
should also have their say, but they simply have fewer votes" (Interview B). In particular, 
more resource-rich firms can afford professionalized structures for training and employ de-
dicated personnel for VET, which improves their ability to get involved in VET or relevant 
committees.
Established Cooperative Practices and Styles of Reasoning 
The established cooperative practices have an impact on the presence of employee and trade 
union representatives. For example, professional associations traditionally working with wor-
ker associations and trade unions typically include employee representatives in their respec-
tive Commission. Here too, however, one interviewee drew a distinction between industry 
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and manual trades: "People in manual trades of course are not thrilled by...such things...and 
the industry has grown accustomed to the unions...and is not scared by them" (Interview F).
The close relationship between cooperative practices and specific styles of reasoning is also 
shaped by a sense of belonging to specific industries: "I have noticed that every industry, and 
of course we are no different, primarily wants to tends to its own garden" and although co-
operation does occur, no one thinks "out of the box". Rather, the cooperation that does take 
place has "a lot of structures behind it, history behind it, personalities behind it" (Interview 
F). What is striking—with implications for future reforms—is that associations are more 
likely to collaborate with others or to create joint occupations if they are in the same indus-
try, even though they might have more in common with professions in another industries. 
Several interviewees said that older associations tend to be conservative: "I'm not saying that 
they are dusty, but when it comes to bigger topics, they tend to do as they have always done" 
(Interview D). Interestingly, one interviewee attributed this desire for continuity to the spe-
cific professional work, which consists of assembling elements designed to last for decades. 
In other words, he believed that occupational activities have an effect on the thinking of the 
companies and ultimately of the associations. 
6 Conclusion: Associations Defining Collectivity and Working Life
Our focus on governance at the meso level has allowed us to unpack the concept of collec-
tive skill formation in Switzerland, which has various facets and meaning for different asso-
ciations and occupations. Legislation from 2002 incorporated standardized elements into 
the governance architecture of Swiss VET, such as the quality assurance Commissions B&Q 
established for every occupation. However, our analysis has shown that the specifics associ-
ated with these structures—membership and cooperative practices—can differ significantly 
between associations and therefore between occupations. This heterogeneity allows the as-
sociations to respond to their own specific needs and those of their members. However, our 
analysis has also shown that some of the decisions are not directly attributable to VET or 
functional negotiations, but rather, to the characteristics, specific cooperative practices and 
styles of reasoning that the associations have developed over time. These findings are under-
pinned by the fact that no patterns of governance were found within one of the occupational 
fields.
Overall, the findings indicate that the negotiations on the ground or, at meso level, are key 
for VET governance in Switzerland. Associations not only shape the content of individual 
VET programs—as their role is described from the macro perspective—but they define the 
structure of working life and collectivity. The latter becomes visible in the different recruiting 
and voting practices within the Commissions B&Q. A board where one or four representa-
tives from the vocational school(s) are integrated will most likely develop or define different 
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priorities. Furthermore, the fact that in some Commissions B&Q the school delegates do not 
have a voting right will affect the decisions that are taken. The same applies with regard to 
the integration of union representatives. Emmenegger et al. (2019) showed that the inclusion 
of unions significantly impacts the time students spend at school. In a context of continuous 
upskilling, the distribution between the time spent in the workplace and at school is crucial 
(SBFI, 2017). Emmenegger et al. also distinguished between liberal (less union integrati-
on, like Switzerland) and social (constant union integration, like Germany) collective skill 
formation systems. However, our examination of the meso level reveals that it is difficult to 
make this distinction clearly, as some occupations in Switzerland demonstrate a high parti-
cipation of union delegates.
In addition to the actual representatives in the Commissions B&Q, the associations or 
their characteristics define collectivity or collective governance. This happens by the gene-
ration of different degrees of influence, either at the level of firms or associations. Despite 
the constant emphasis on consensus democracy among interviewees (in some cases, even 
using the metaphor of a family), there is an important role played by accumulated influence, 
which points to hegemonic structures. For example, associations and companies with larger 
budgets have more influence and a greater ability to shape VET than financially weaker or-
ganizations. This is because big budgets allow for professionalized structures and full time 
staff instead of part time volunteers. As the pressure to professionalize increases, e.g., through 
shorter review periods and competence-based curricula, these tendencies are likely to be-
come more pronounced. 
Furthermore, our findings indicate that associations not only shape individual professi-
ons but also the VET landscape and the general structure of working life. This is seen when 
they prevent or encourage the merger of different occupations to become a larger occupa-
tional field. Furthermore, the specific forms of thinking that inform associations within an 
industry, such as maintaining established infrastructures or carrying out traditional coope-
rative practices, may override "rational" objectives such as the similarity of training curricula. 
Generally, the interviews stressed that many influencing factors are historically informed. 
They described a persistent inertia, not only in "material" structures but also in ideas. Asso-
ciations and companies tend to rely on an established matrix of ideas that resists new visions 
and reforms. Our study focussed exclusively on two occupational fields, but it is reasonable 
to assume that these findings are transferrable to other occupational fields, although some as-
sociations may introduce new forms of governance depending on their characteristics. Once 
a certain path has been taken, domino effects— known in the literature on path dependen-
cies as "increasing returns" (Beyer, 2005)—can occur. These can increase the importance of 
individual companies and, in the long term, can establish new power structures. The effects 
of a path are therefore not only evident at the national level, but also at the meso level, in the 
governance regimes and paradigms of associations. It may prove challenging for VET gover-
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nance in collective skill formation systems to overcome well-established cooperation practi-
ces and styles of reasoning, move beyond unnecessary restrictions and think "out of the box". 
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